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N 1959, FOLLOWING THE APPEARANCE of several relevant and note-
worthy books,' the American Law Institute proposed a radical lib-
eralization of the nation's abortion laws. 2 As finally adopted, the
proposal would legalize an abortion if a licensed physician "believes
there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the
child would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the
pregnancy resulted from rape [including statutory rape], incest, or other
felonious intercourse."' 3 At the time, the Institute admitted that the pre-
vailing pattern of American abortion laws was absolute prohibition ex-
cept to save the life of the mother, with only half a dozen states going
so far as to recognize the preservation of health as an independent
justification. 4
In 1959, the proponents of liberalization began a multi-front cam-
paign for legislative adoption of the ALI's proposal. The movement, in
turn, sparked a continuing debate which has become so emotionally
charged, particularly with religious recriminations, that sometimes we
tend to lose sight of what is at stake. At such times it is necessary to
remind ourselves that, theological considerations aside, an induced
abortion is the deliberate destruction of an innocent human life and
that the liberalization movement is based upon an ethic both alien to
our jurisprudence and at odds with the general trend of the law. The
purpose of this article is to serve as such a reminder.
*B.S. (1953), LL.B. (1959), Fordham University; Assistant Professor of Law,
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I CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (1958); GEBHARD, POMEROY,
MARTIN & CHRISTENSON, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND ABORTION (1958); WILLIAMS,
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1957). [Hereinafter cited respec-
tively as CALDERONE, GEBHARD, and WILLIAMS.]
2 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, comments (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Official Draft, 1962).
4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3, at 146 (Official Draft, 1962).
ABORTION
Fetal Life is Human Life
Abortion destroys fetal life, but is that
which is killed a human being? The signifi-
cance of this question comes into clearest
focus when viewed from the perspective of
legal history.
For centuries, ethical opinion on the
humanity of the fetus was based upon an
ancient scientific theory which taught that
the male implanted the seed of potential
humanity in the fertile field of the female
from which the seed drew the power to
educe a sensitive soul.5 Prior to the recep-
tion of the soul, the unborn child was con-
sidered a part of the mother "as the fruit
is a part of the tree." Aristotle postulated
three stages in the development of the
fetus. The purely vegetable life began at
the moment of conception and to this
were added, successively, animal and ra-
tional souls. Augustine and Galen fixed the
Aristotelian hypothesis in the ethical and
medical sciencesJ and Thomas Aquinas
added the refinement that life is demon-
strated by knowledge and movement.
Bracton, the earliest common law authority
on the subject and a contemporary of
Aquinas, equated movement with quicken-
ing (perceptible movement in the womb),
so that from Bracton's time until the en-
actment of the first English abortion statute
in 1803,9 deliberate destruction of the fetus
5Gutwenger, An Illustration of the Influence of
Medical Science upon Theological Thought, 17
CATHOLIC MEDICAL GUARDIAN 137-38 (1940).
GDavies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity,
2 MODERN L. REV. 126, 131 (1938).
7See Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and
Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 395, 426-29
(1961).
8 WILLIAMS 151.
9 Miscarriage of Women Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c.
58.
was criminal only if it occurred after quick-
ening, i.e., after human life had begun.'
The 1803 enactment, however, forbade
abortion at any stage of the pregnancy but
quickening remained crucial in fixing the
extent of the punishment."" In most of the
original American abortion statutes, quick-
ening determined either criminality or pun-
ishment. 12
At the very least, the crime of abortion
entered our law as a means of protecting
human life against deliberate destruction.
The law, however, was not competent to
determine for itself when human life began
in utero. Rather, it took the cooperative
effort of law and contemporary science to
make quickening the decisive test. Pro-
tecting human life is still a function of the
law and therefore it still remains necessary
to begin any discussion of abortion with
the inquiry: what does science teach today
about the humanity of the fetus? This
question was propounded to Dr. Herbert
Ratner, a physician and lecturer, and the
Public Health Director of Oak Park, Il-
linois. Dr. Ratner replied as follows:
Modern science regards the embryo as a
human being from the moment that the
male spermatazoa fertilizes the female ovum
to form a 'zygote.'
Fertilization produces a new life. The
ancient theory that the embryo is pars
viscerum matris has been discredited and
it is now accepted that the new embryonic
life is an independent, functioning organ-
ism. Of course, the embryo depends upon
the mother for nutriment and an environ-
ment conducive to growth, but so does the
suckling babe.
We have also rejected the theory that
the embryo passes through a subhuman
10 WILLIAMS 154-52.
11 id. at 152.
12 Quay, supra note 7, at 437. See generally id.
at 435-37.
stage in the womb. From the moment of
zygote formation, the characteristics of a
highly individuated human organism are
established by the intermixture and com-
bination of the genes, chromosomes and
cytoplasm contributed by the parental hu-
man egg and sperm. This includes not only
sex but a whole spectrum of human traits,
both external and internal, organic and
functional. . . .For the geneticist the in-
dividuality of the adult is the unfolding of
the unknown, as well as the yet to be
identified genetic determinants within the
fertilized egg which give it the essential
individuality that subsequently marks the
adult. The lay person should readily be
able to see that as we project the adult
from the given newborn, so the infant
(and subsequently the adult) is primarily
a projection of the individualized human
being, the fertilized egg.
This new, individualized, human life
starts to grow immediately, and after sev-
eral days, begins to implant itself in the
womb. The implantation process is not
significant vis-a-vis the embryo's humanity.
A bird, in or out of the nest, is still a bird.
The ancients thought that fetal growth
occurred in stages, but actually the devel-
opment of the fetus is gradual and direc-
tive, much like the post-natal growth of
the child. In this growth process, birth is a
transitional event which adds nothing more
to the essential humanity of the child than
does puberty.
The implication that abortion is a
"crime without a victim''1 ' is obviously
unscientific. The victim, as Dr. Ratner's
reply makes clear, is a human being what-
ever the stage of the pregnancy may be.
The child in the earliest stages of preg-
nancy may not look like a human being
but, biologically and ethically, the only
logical and satisfactory view is to regard
"' See SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS (paper-
back ed. 1965).
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the embryo as a human being from the
outset. 14 Is it not established in our law
that all human beings are entitled to equal
protection of the law?
Liberalization Is Not
Medically Necessary
Why then are we urged to deny this
protection to unborn children? Despite
references to the physical. and mental
health of the mother, there is no medical
need for a change in the law. Indeed, since
the liberalization movement began, the an-
nual rate of therapeutic abortions has
dropped from an estimated 18,000 in
1958 a" to a current estimate of 8,000.16
Even before 1958 we were being told of a
".. . gradual realization, based on exten-
sive clinical experience, that pregnancy, if
properly managed, seldom aggravates or-
ganic disease."' 7 In addition, there is sub-
stantial evidence that abortion will ex-
acerbate mental disease.' 8  It is one
psychiatrist's impression "that pregnant
women are more apt to make a satisfactory
recovery from their psychosis, and to do
so more promptly than comparable pa-
tients who are not pregnant."'19
14 MARSHALL, MEDICINE AND MORALS 66 (paper-
back ed. 1964).
11 Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal
Foundations, 49 GEO. L.J. 173, 232 (1960).
16 Lader, The Scandal of Abortion Laws, N.Y.
Times, April 25, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), p. 32.
However, a recent study points to a rise in abor-
tions based upon "psychiatric indications." Id.,
June 22, 1965, p. 42, col. 4.
17 Eastman, Obstetrical Foreword to ROSEN,
THERAPEUTIC ABORTION at xix (1954).
18 See Comment, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 283,
289-90 (1965); Note, 10 CATHOLIC LAW. 161,
168 (1964).
19 Murdock, Experiences in a Psychiatric Hospi-
tal, in ROSEN, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 203
(1954).
ABORTION
When one examines the literature of
those who would liberalize the law, one
realizes that "physical health" does not
refer to medical health during pregnancy
but to socioeconomic circumstances follow-
ing birth. If, for instance, an additional
child in the home would put an undue
strain upon the physical resources of the
mother, who is economically unable to af-
ford help, abortion would be justified on
so-called physical health grounds. Presum-
ably, if such a mother were able to afford
a nurse to care for the child, an abortion
would not be justified on "physical health"
grounds. In short, we are asked to ration
the law's protection to unborn children
on the basis of the economic status of
their parents.
Mental illness, too, has become a
pseudonym for the socioeconomic prob-
lems of living.' As mental disease was dis-
carded as a justification for abortion,
"neurotics were quickly substituted for
psychotics; and in one writing after another
we begin to find suggestions that the medi-
cal man should recognize unmedical indi-
cations-economic, social, the wish of the
patient-to determine his course as a
medical man. '2 1 So we find "social well-
being," 22 and "economic need severe
enough to affect the health of the family
unit, ''2 being classified as health factors.
As early as 1955, the Planned Parenthood
Conference was informed that fifty-nine
per cent of the legal abortions performed
in Sweden between 1950 and 1953 were
20See SZAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY
11-17 (1963).
21 Quay, supra note 15, at 223.
22 Abortion and the Law, CBS REPORTS (tran-
script p. 21), April 5, 1965.
23 Kleegman, Planned Parenthood: Its Influence
on Public Health and Family Welfare, in ROSEN,
THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 258 (1954).
based to a large extent on post-natal socio-
logical factors. 24 Dr. Alfred Kinsey re-
vealed to the Conference that some psy-
chiatrists were recommending abortions on
grounds similar to those written into the
Scandanavian laws.
25
It has been observed that the major
portion of the induced abortions in the
United States are socioeconomically moti-
vated. 21; Apparently reformers intend to
bring the socioeconomic abortion under
the mantle of the law via the euphemism
"health." To support their position they
argue the immorality of a law which pro-
hibits the termination of an unwanted
pregnancy. "For a state to force a woman
to bear a child against her will is out-
rageous."27 "The real sin, reformers de-
clare, is the law that demands an unwanted
child. 12s Of course, any moral code which
sanctions the destruction of an innocent
human life because it is burdensome and
unwanted, is totally alien to our juris-
prudence. "[R]espect for human life is not
based . ..on any attempt to balance the
pleasure and pain that may come to a
human being during his life span, but on
the plain fact that the life to be protected is
human life and therefore sacred. '" 29
24 CALDERONE 25-28 (interview with Dr. Gun-
nar Geijerstam).
25 CALDERONE 52 (interview with Dr. Alfred
Kinsey).
26 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3, at 149 (Official
Draft, 1962).
27 Lader, supra note 16, at 32 (quoting Dorothy
Kenyon).
28 Id. at 62.
29 ST. JOHN-STEVAS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE 114
(1963). "Insistence on the absolute inviolability
of innocent human Jife will certainly occasion
suffering. But in the past this suffering was a
challenge to medical science and to our charity;
acceptance of this challenge proved, in the long
run, to be a life-saving principle. Only by facing
The writer, in several debates with re-
formers, has encountered a variation of
the socioeconomic argument which goes
something like this: the well-to-do, private
patient is able to retain a qualified phy-
sician to perform an abortion under anti-
septic conditions, while the impecunious
woman must either entrust her life to a
quack in a back room or bear the child;
therefore, the law discriminates against the
poor. However, the law should not be
changed merely because of an advantage
the rich might have over the poor in pur-
suit of a criminal endeavor. It would be
rather ridiculous, for instance, to repeal the
criminal sanctions presently imposed upon
the tax evader merely because the rich
can afford expert assistance in committing
tax frauds. The argument begs the question
entirely.
From another viewpoint, it seems in-
congruous to find a declaration against
capital punishment of the guilty" ac-
companied by a movement to permit pre-
natal destruction of the innocent. It would
seem that the murderer is no less "un-
wanted" than the unborn child. As a matter
of fact, the reformers' basic premise that
"there are no legal rights of a fetus"31 is
completely at odds with the trend in other
areas of the law to accord the unborn
child its appropriate status as a human
being.32 We should not take a reactionary
step backward in order to accommodate
suffering in a human way can we expect to make
progress-and to stay human ourselves." McCor-
mick, Abortion, 112 AMERICA 877, 880 (June
19, 1965).
30 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, comment 1,
at 65 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
31 Abortion and the Law, CBS REPORTS (tran-
script p. 25).
32 See PROSSER, TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964); See
generally Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63
MICH. L. REV. 579 (1965).
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the special brand of sectarianism that pro-
claims the "sin of the law that demands an
unwanted child."
The Supermensch Philosophy of
Eugenic Abortion
In addition to socioeconomic abortion,
reformers also urge us to legalize eugenic
abortion-to exclude a human life from
the protection of the law solely because it
may be defective. The supermensch phil-
osophy, which places defectives beyond
the pale, is utterly repugnant to our juris-
prudence. Reformers point to the recent
decision in Williams v. State,33 wherein
the court refused to dismiss the claim of
an infant who alleged that she had been
conceived and born as a result of a rape in
a state mental institution, and that th- rape
would not have occurred but for negligent
supervision by the institution's staff. It is
argued by reformers that the decision es-
tablishes a cause of action for wrongful
birth and that it justifies, and perhaps man-
dates an abortion whenever the child
would enter the world under adverse cir-
cumstances, e.g., as a mental or physical
defective. 34 But the reformers fail to note
that the court specifically expressed its
"disinclination to approve the appellation:
'a cause of action for wrongful life.' "-35 The
weak and the unfortunate have tradition-
ally been the wards of the law, not its
outcasts.
The Emotional Appeal of
"Humanitarian" Abortion
The reformers' final proposal, to legalize
-- 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl.
1965).
.4 N.Y. Times, June 26, 1965, p. 1, col. 2.
35 Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d. 824, 830, 260
N.Y.S.2d 953, 959 (1965).
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the termination of a pregnancy which has
resulted from rape or incest, has a first-
blush appeal.3 6 The pregnant girl stirs us
to compassion while we find it difficult to
identify emotionally with the minute, out-
of-sight fetus. The law, however, does not
mete out its protection on the basis of
emotion. It is no less a crime in law to
murder a despised assassin than it is to
assassinate a beloved president. Both are
equally entitled to the protection of the
law. Moreover, before the rapist may be
punished, he must be proved guilty of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the unborn
child of the rape is innocent of any crime.
Finally, it is important to understand
that abortion is proposed here as a "hu-
manitarian" measure and not necessarily
as a psychiatric one.37 It is difficult to com-
prehend how, in our jurisprudence, the de-
struction of an innocent human life can
ever be considered genuinely humanitarian.
The Problem of Illegal Abortions
Illegal abortion, an extremely difficult
crime to bring to light, constitutes a major
law enforcement problem in the United
36 Reformers find support for this proposal in the
case of R. v. Bourne [1938] 3 All E.R. 615
(CCC) wherein it was held that an abortion is
justified to preserve the life of the woman, which
includes saving her from physical and mental
injury. The aborted female in the case was a
fourteen year old girl who had become pregnant
as a result of being raped. The case has been
criticized for its interpretation of the English
abortion statute, see Quay, supra note 7, at 433-
35, and the effect of the decision is doubtful even
today. Lederman, The Doctor, Abortion, and the
Law-A Medicolegal Dilemma, 6 CAN. B.J. 136,
145 (1963); see generally id. at 145-47.
37 Rosen, The Emotionally Sick Pregnant Patient:
Psychiatric Indications and Contraindications to
the Interruption of Pregnancy, in ROSEN, THERA-
PEUTIC ABORTION 243 (1954).
States. It is said that an authoritative con-
sensus tallies 1,000,000 criminal abortions,
and more than 5,000 abortion-deaths an-
nually.38 While this may be true, we must
be careful in the choice of solutions.
"Where fundamental human values are at
stake, law must be judged by other criteria
than its mere effectiveness in preventing
crime. Here, above all, law is the voice of
society's conscience."' 39 Thus, as one writer
has said, "every hypothetical solution must
be reconciled with the basic purpose of
protecting the life of child,"4 0-and legal-
ized abortion cannot be so reconciled.
Moreover, experiences in Scandanavia in-
dicate that the American Law Institute's
proposal may actually produce an increase
in illegal abortions.
In Sweden parallel liberalizations were
enacted in an "attempt to stem the evi-
dently increasing rate of criminal abor-
tions."'1  Yet there has been no "note-
worthy reduction" and some claim that the
populace has become "abortion minded"
and that illegal abortions have increased. 4 2
Denmark has had a similar experience, 43
and apparently some Scandanavians are
seeking abortions in Poland where the law
is even more permissive.4
The failure of the Scandanavian experi-
ment is understandable. When a radical
"liberalization" occurs in the legal order,
3s Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Fail-
ure of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52 (1964).
9 Editorial, Morality and Policy: IV, 112 AMER-
ICA 520, 521 (April 17, 1965).
40Comment, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 292
(1965).
41 CALDERONE 25 (interview with Dr. Gunnar
Geijerstam).
4_GEBHARD 224.
43 CALDERONE 173-74 (interview with Dr. Joseph
P. Donnelly).
44 N.Y. Times, February 14, 1965, p. 20, col. 3.
the moral force of the law is weakened
and the liberalization is quite frequently
followed by a more far-reaching break-
down in public morality. Specifically, if
the law were to devalue fetal life for one
purpose, a significant segment of public
opinion would devalue it for many other
(extra-legal) purposes. When one judges
the morality of abortion on motives, thera-
peutic or otherwise, and not by its object,
abortion can have no limits. 45
On the other hand, the law has an edu-
cational function. When reformers argue
that, "To use the criminal law against a
substantial body of decent opinion . .
is contrary to our basic traditions, ' 46 they
forget that the law may appropriately be
used to teach the specific application of
a principle which even that "substantial
body of decent opinion" is willing to ac-
cept. For instance, the law is being used
45 Tiberghien, Principles and Moral Conscience,
in FLOOD, NEW PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL ETHICS
32 (paperback ed. 1963). See also Editorial,
supra note 39.
46 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3, at 151 (Official
Draft, 1962).
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today against otherwise decent citizens to
orient them to a particular application of
the principle that all men are created
equal.
The task, then, is to bring the public
to a realization of the fact that pre-natal
life is innocent human life and, like all such
life, is inherently sacred. There are many
who can contribute in different ways: state
legislatures, by supplementing their abor-
tion laws with a statement of public policy
opposing permissive abortion and reassert-
ing the humanity of the unborn child; the
medical profession, by restating its role
as the guardian of both the mother and
the unborn child; and the mass media, by
giving suitable coverage to advanced em-
bryological findings and opinions. 4 7 Most
important of all, to those who weigh the
value of a life on the scales of social utility
and convenience, the legal profession must
reply with an unequivocal reaffirmation of
the sanctity and inalienability of all inno-
cent human life.
47 E.g., Life Magazine, April 30, 1965, p. 54;
Time Magazine, April 30, 1965, p. 58, col. 3.
